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ZONING
Municipal Corporations-Zoning-Good Faith Expenditures in
Reliance on Building Permits as a Vested Right in North Carolina
Zoning has long been recognized as a constitutionally valid exercise
of a state's police power ;1 however, the exercise of this power has resulted
in considerable controversy in cases in which a zoning ordinance is en-
acted subsequent to the issuance of a building permit upon which the
permittee has relied.2 In Town of Hillsborough v. Smith,' the defendants,
having acquired an option on a lot, obtained a building permit to construct
a dry cleaning establishment. After the permit was issued, the defendants
exercised their option, signed a fifteen thousand dollar building contract,
and ordered a considerable amount of business equipment. Five days
later the town enacted a zoning ordinance restricting for residential use
an area which included the defendants' property. The defendants con-
tinued to make expenditures until they received a letter revoking their
building permit and were shown a copy of the enacted ordinance. Despite
the revocation, they later commenced construction on the lot.4 When the
town sought to enjoin further work, the defendants answered that since
they had made good faith expenditures in reliance on the building permit,
without notice of the pending ordinance, they had acquired a vested right
to complete construction. 5
Although the trial court found in favor of the defendants,6 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals granted a new trial on the grounds of an
erroneous jury instruction.7 The North Carolina Supreme Court, re-
versing, affirmed the trial court's verdict.8 The court reasoned that all
expenses incidental to the construction that were incurred prior to the
effective date of the zoning ordinance would create a vested right to
complete construction if the expenses were substantial in nature and made
18 E. McQuiLLIN, TE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.05 (3d ed.
1965) [hereinafter cited as McQumILIN]; see, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); McKinney v. City of High Point, 239 N.C. 232,
79 S.E.2d 730 (1954).
'See generally 9 MCQUILLIN §§26.200-.227; 1 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND
PACTI E §§ 9-5 to -9 (3d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as YoXiLEY].
"276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
'Id. at 50, 170 S.E.2d at 906.
'Record at 4, Town of Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904
(1969).
'The trial court judge framed the issue for the jury as being whether "the
defendants, in good faith, and without notice of the pending zoning ordinance pro-
hibiting the use of their property for business purposes, incur[red] substantial
expenses in reliance upon the building permit issued to them on May 3, 1968[.]"
Id. at 30.
74 N.C. App. 316, 167 S.E.2d 51 (1969).
"276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
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in good faith reliance on the building permit.9 Despite conflict in the
testimony, the jury's verdict was held to be conclusive on the issues of the
defendant's good faith and lack of notice of the pending ordinance.10 The
court further held that substantial expenditures had been made and there-
fore a vested right had accrued in favor of the permittee.
The theory of vested rights accruing from reliance on a building
permit is closely related to the doctrine of nonconforming use." A non-
conforming use has been defined as "[a] structure or land lawfully
occupied by a use that does not conform to the regulations of the district
in which it is situated."' Such a use existing when a zoning ordinance
is enacted that prohibits or restricts that particular use in effect becomes
a vested right and, as a general rule, may be continued.'3 This vested
right theory has not only been applied to a nonconforming use when
construction was incomplete before the passage of the restrictive ordinance,
but also to building permits when substantial expenditures have been
made in good faith reliance on the permit. 4
Before resolving the issue of whether a permittee's expenditures are
substantial, the court must initially ascertain the elusive element of good
faith. Although the majority of jurisdictions insist upon good faith where
expenditures are made in reliance upon building permits,' apparently there
is no definite formula for its measure. A New York case concluded that
one method of ascertaining good faith was the large amount of money
9 Id. at 55, 170 S.E.2d at 909 (1969).10 Id. at 56, 170 S.E.2d at 912-13.
118 McQuILLiN § 25.157.
1 P GREEN, ZONING IN NORTH CAROLINA 127 (1952). Another authority's
definition is "a lawful use existing on the effective date of the zoning restriction
and continuing since that time in nonconformance to the ordinance." 2 YOxLEY
§ 16-2.
See 8-A MCQUILLIN §§ 25.180-.188.
"Id. § 25.181. The idea of a vested right arising from expenditures in good
faith reliance on a building permit is considered a property right of the sort guaran-
teed in the Constitution. Willis v. Woodruff, 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E.2d 699 (1942).
Another argument permittees use is the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which for-
bids a municipality to revoke a building permit after the permittee has made sub-
stantial expenditures in reliance on the permit. See, e.g., Township of Pittsfield
v. Malcolm, 255 Iowa 761, 124 N.W.2d 166 (1965) (dog kennel had been built
under a permit at a cost of forty-five thousand dollars; a delay of ten months before
injunction was sought created equitable estoppel). There are many states, however,
that do not allow equitable estoppel to apply to a municipality. E.g., City of
Gastonia v. Parrish, 271 N.C. 527, 157 S.E.2d 154 (1967). For a more detailed
discussion of the applications of equitable estoppel to building permit denials, see
9 McQuiLLiN §§ 26.213, 27.56; 1 YoKLEY § 10-8; Note, Revoked Building Permits
and Equitable Estoppel in Florida, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 418 (1962).
" 9 McQUILLIN § 26.219; 1 YOILEY § 9-5; 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 243 (1958).
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spent by the permittee in reliance on the legality of his permit."8 Another
New York decision held that surveys and paper work over an eight
month period was sufficient indication of a property owner's good
faith, even though construction was not commenced until one month
,before a zoning ordinance was amended to prohibit the intended use."
On the other hand, where a permittee possessed only an option on a tract
of land, knowledge of open neighborhood hostility and delay in con-
struction resulted in an adjudication of bad faith.' Lapse of time between
the date of the permit and the date the ordinance becomes effective is
frequently relevant on the issue of good faith.'"
In Stowe v. Burke," the North Carolina Supreme Court explicitly
made good faith a requirement for acquiring a vested right where there
is reliance upon a building permit. The evidence showed that the owner
actually knew of the pending ordinance and the hostility of his neighbors
to the proposed use. An expenditure of over fifty-five thousand dollars
on foundation work ten days before the ordinance took effect could not
create a vested right absent good faith.2 ' Thus, although amount of money
expended may be an indication of good faith, it is not the sole criteria
and will be rejected if there are other signs that point to bad faith.
Knowledge of hostility was also present in Warner v. W & 0, Inc.,'
in which neighbors filed a petition for rezoning the day after the optionee
obtained a building permit. Although the permit holder knew of the
pending zoning ordinance, he exercised his option on the property and
had several trees removed before the ordinance became effective. On the
question of good faith, the court stated that the law would not help anyone
expending money for a known illegal purpose, nor "one who waits until
after an ordinance has been enacted forbidding the proposed use and...
" Pelham View Apts., Inc. v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224 N.Y.S. 56 (Sup. Ct.
1927) (plaintiff, in reliance on a permit, bought land, hired an architect, executed
a mortgage and excavated the cellar); accord, Glenel Realty Corp. v. Worth-
ington, 4 App. Div. 2d 702, 164 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1957).
" Miller v. Dassler, 155 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
" Miami Shores Village v. Win. N. Brockway Post, 156 Fla. 673, 24 So. 2d 33
(1945) (en banc); accord, Graham Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn.
1, 97 A.2d 564 (1953) (knowledge of hostility and hurried expenditures before
ordinance enacted evidence of bad faith).
" Williams v. Village of Deer Park, 78 Ohio App. 231, 69 N.E.2d 536 (1946)(permit granted one day before lot annexed to city with prohibitive ordinance).
20255 N.C. 527, 122 S.E.2d 374 (1961).211 Id. at 533, 122 S.E.2d at 378. The findings of fact allowed the trial judge to
conclude as a matter of law that the defendant had acted in bad faith.22263 N.C. 37, 138 S.E.2d 782 (1964).
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hastens to thwart the legislative act by making expenditures a few hours
prior to the effective date of the ordinance ...."23
It seems unlikely that the permittee in Smith should win in light of the
decisions in Stowe and Warner. The cases serve to highlight that proper
resolution of the factual controversy is critical to the issue of good faith.
Proof that the defendant had notice of the proposed zoning ordinance upon
receiving his permit would have precluded the defense of good faith
reliance. Had there been no factual dispute, the trial judge could have
determined the issue of good faith as a matter of law.24 Ultimately, the
jury decided the question as one of fact with no firm guidelines as to what
constituted good faith. The court did state that a conscious race with the
city to make expenditures before a prohibitive zoning ordinance is adopted
shows a lack of good faith.25 However, the court did not explain how this
"race" can be recognized, nor did it specifically discuss the relevancy of
time as a factor in determining its existence.
Closely associated with the issue of good faith is the element of
notice.26 Some jurisdictions limit a permittee's opportunity to create a
vested right by declaring that no right will ensue if the permittee has
actual or constructive knowledge of the pending ordinance.27 In North
Carolina, if the permittee makes expenditures when he has actual knowledge
of a pending ordinance, such action is apparently a sign of bad faith .2
However, the precise effect of constructive notice is unclear. In Stowe,
there was evidence that the permittee received written notice of the
hearing to be held on the zoning ordinance. In addition, advertisements
appeared in the local newspaper, and the hostility of surrounding property
owners did not go unconcealed. 9 In Warner, the ordinance was adopted
23Id. at 43, 138 S.E.2d at 787.
,For further information about the testimony, see Record at 13-26, Town of
Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
276 N.C. at 56, 170 S.E.2d at 910.
As in Stowe and Warner, the trial judge properly instructed the jury in
Smith that expenditures must be made in good faith "without knowledge of the
pending ordinance." Record at 30, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
"'1 YOKELY § 9-7; see, e.g., Sharrow v. City of Dania, 83 So. 2d 274 (Fla.
1955) (permit was subject to revocation despite expenditures in reliance
when proposed ordinance had been heard on first reading before adoption by city
council); accord, Tuscon v. Arizona Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495, 272 P. 923 (1928)
(no vested right to build when informed before major construction that
ordinance affecting land is contemplated). Contra, Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa.
223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960) (unpassed city council ordinance has no governmental
authority). See Note, 15 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 418, =npra note 14.
"Warner v. W & 0, Inc., 263 N.C. 37, 138 S.E.2d 782 (1964); Stowe v.
Burke, 255 N.C. 527, 122 S.E.2d 374 (1961).
"255 N.C. at 533, 122 S.E.2d at 378.
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before any construction started, and the permit holder was well aware
of neighborhood opposition to the proposed use.30 In Smith, however,
none of these factors was clearly present. The defendant admitted
hearing vague talk of a proposed ordinance, but did not believe that it
affected him.3 The town argued that publication of the notice of the
hearing imparted constructive knowledge of the pending ordinance ;
32
hence, they urged that Smith should not be allowed to account for ex-
penditures made after the date of publication. The court, however, held
that all expenditures were valid until the effective date of the ordinance
and that a jury verdict of no notice was conclusive. 3 The concept of
sufficient notice thus remains confused. The confusion could have been
considerablly reduced if the court had explicitly stated its views on con-
structive notice. Arguably, Smith stands for the proposition that news-
paper advertisements stating that a public hearing is to be held on a
pending zoning ordinance do not impart constructive notice such as will
bar a finding of good faith. The court has probably made the better
choice here by allowing the jury to hear evidence of constructive notice,
without declaring it bad faith as a matter of law.
After resolving the issues of good faith and notice, another problem
remains: how does the court determine what constitutes substantial
expenditures? Most jurisdictions hold that a building permit alone does
not create a vested right3 4 but that the landowner must make substantial
expenditures or incur substantial obligations in reliance on the building
263 N.C. at 41, 138 S.E.2d at 785.
Record at 19, 22, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969).
Brief for Apellant at 7, 11, 4 N.C. App. 316, 167 S.E.2d 51 (1969).
276 N.C. at 56, 170 S.E.2d at 910
"8 McQumLIN § 25.156; 101 C.J.S. Zoning § 243 (1958); see, e.g., Graham
Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 1, 97 A.2d 564 (1953); Roselle v.
Moonachie, 49 N.J. Super. 35, 139 A.2d 42 (Super. Ct. 1958). Contra, Yocum
v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960) (permit for church issued under
existing law could not be revoked because of pending proceedings to prohibit
use); Shapiro v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954)
(issuance of permit allowed right to vest); Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331
P.2d 856 (1958) (lack of expenditure or change of position did not invalidate
permit; right vests on application for permit if thereafter issued). Indeed, one
authority suggests that some recent cases show a trend of allowing a right to vest
if reliance expenditures are made pending issuance of a building permit. 1
YOKLEY § 9-5 at 409 (citations omitted). Contra, Spur Distributing Co. v. City
of Burlington, 216 N.C. 32, 3 S.E.2d 427 (1939) (permit denied where the
ordinance was enacted during consideration of the permit application). North
Carolina followed the majority rule in Warner v. W & 0, Inc., 263 N.C. 37, 41,
138 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1964), holding that "[tlhe permit created no vested right;
it merely authorized permittee to act."
1970] ZONING
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
permit. 5 The Town of Hillsborough argued that the test for establishing
a substantial expenditure is whether or not actual construction has begun.8"
Rejecting this contention, the court adopted the majority rule as stated by
the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Winn v. Lamoy Realty Corp. :
"the better view ... is that where an owner, relying in good faith upon a
permit and before it has been revoked, has made substantial construction
on the property or has incurred substantial liabilities, relating directly
thereto ... the permit may not be cancelled."
In deciding a substantial expenditure question, two factors must be
kept in mind-what type of expenditure will be considered, and how much
expenditure is substantial. In a case prior to Smith in which business
equipment was purchased and placed at the site of a proposed service
station, the North Carolina Supreme Court admitted this evidence and
allowed the jury to determine whether these expenditures were sub-
stantial.3 Apparently, an expenditure of this type was one the court
would allow a jury to consider in reaching their verdict. The decision
in Warner hinged on the absence of the property owner's good faith,
but had language indicating that incidental expenditures as opposed to
actual construction, are relevant to the resolution of a vested rights ques-
tion. The court in Warner carefully examined the facts-that an archi-
tect's drawing completed before issuance of the building permit was not
contracted for in reliance on it, that a contract to purchase land that was
voidable would not create a vested right, and that the removal of several
trees before the ordinance took effect was not substantial construction."0
Presumably, if the contract had been binding, and the drawings made
in reliance, those expenses would have been considered.4"
8 McQUILLIN § 25.157; 9 Id. § 26.219; 1 YOKLEY § 9-5.
' Brief for Appellant at 11, 4 N.C. App. 316, 167 S.E.2d 51 (1969). This is
the minority rule. See, e.g., Kiges v. City of St. Paul, 240 Minn. 582, 62 N.W.2d
363 (1953).
' 100 N.H. 280, 281, 124 A.2d 211, 213 (1956) (emphasis added) (no vested
rights acquired where expenses and obligations were very small in relation to the
total cost of the proposed building). The rule was followed in North Carolina
although it was used more to advocate a good faith requirement than to articulate
a position on substantial expenditures. See Stowe v. Burke, 255 N.C. 527, 122
S.E.2d 374 (1961).88 i re Rose Builder's Supply Co., 202 N.C. 497, 163 S.E. 462 (1932).
263 N.C. at 41-42, 138 S.E.2d at 785.
40 In It re Tadlock, 261 N.C. 120, 134 S.E.2d 177 (1964), the court would not
allow the plaintiff to enlarge a trailer, park, part of which had been completed
before an ordinance prohibiting the use was adopted, because the enlargement was
still in the planning stage. This case was decided on the basis of a nonconforming
use since a building permit had never been issued. Presumably, the same result
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Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has noted with approval
the majority rule pertaining to substantial expenditures, Smith is ap-
parently the first case to face squarely the issue of what types of expendi-
tures will be considered in creating a vested property right. The court
explicitly stated that they found no difference between expenditures
resulting in physical changes to the land itself, and expenditures made
for construction materials, equipment, or for contracts for construction or
equipment.4 Although the court in Warner held it unnecessary for a
permittee to complete construction before the ordinance took effect,4" in
Smith, the court sets forth more complete guidelines for permit holders
attempting to acquire a vested right to complete construction on the
basis of substantial expenditures. In considering the amount expended
and the nature of the obligations incurred, rather than physical change in
the land itself, the jury is allowed to arrive at a more equitable deter-
mination of whether substantial expenditures have actually occurred.
43
By holding that binding contractual obligations made in good faith
reliance will be considered as substantial expenditures,44 the court may
have created an additional problem in determining what constitutes a
binding obligation. In Warner,45 the contract to purchase property was
not considered a valid expense because it was voidable. Smith may make
it necessary for a court to make an initial determination of the enforce-
ability of the contracts involved in order to reach the substantial expendi-
ture question.
The court in Smith detailed the types of expenditures that will be
of not allowing completion of one stage to create a vested right for construction
of further stages will also apply to the situation in which the landowner has relied
on a building permit to complete the first stage.
41 276 N.C. at 55, 170 S.E.2d at 909.
It is not .. .a change in the appearance of the land, which creates the
vested property right in the holder of the permit. The basis of the right to
build and use his land, in accordance with the permit issued to him, is his
change of his own position in bona fide reliance upon the permit.
Id.
263 N.C. at 41, - 138 S.E.2d at 785.
'
8 Ohio, Pennsylvania and Washington are among the minority of states that
do not consider expenses, holding that the vested right accrues upon application for
the permit if it should have been later issued. See, e.g., Gibson v. City of Oberlin,
171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960); Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d
368 (1960) ; Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958). For a more
thorough discussion of the Ohio position, see Note, Municipal Corporations-
Zoning-Law at Time of Application for Building Permit Controlling, 30 U. CIN.
L. REv. 380 (1961). See also Note, 15 U. FLA. L. RPv. 418, supra note 14.
" 276 N.C. at 54, 170 S.E.2d at 909.
" 263 N.C. at 42, 138 S.E.2d at 785.
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allowed as evidence of substantial expenditure; however, the question of
what dollar amount is required to make these expenditures substantial was
not fully discussed. Although the issue is normally left to the jury, the
court indicated that the mere purchase of property, no matter what the
cost, will not suffice.46 Thus, the jury is left with almost unlimited latitude
in determining the dollar amount of expenditure necessary for the creation
of a vested right. Perhaps a better solution than leaving so much dis-
cretion with the jury would be to establish a certain minimum percentage
of the estimated total cost of building as the necessary requirement for a
vested right to complete construction. The main disadvantage in estab-
lishing a fixed minimum percentage is readily observed when one considers
large-scale enterprises. Such undertakings would be required to expend
greater sums in order to satisfy the percentage requirement. If they fall
short, the right to complete construction is lost. Meanwhile, less ex-
pansive enterprises can easily satisfy the requirement with a propor-
tionately smaller expenditure, thus acquiring a vested right to complete
construction. A suggested minimum percentage would, however, provide
a useful rule-of-thumb in many instances.
Despite some unanswered questions, the area of vested rights is now
much clearer in North Carolina. A permittee now knows that money
expended on anything incidental to the proposed use-building contracts,
equipment, purchase money-will be allowed as evidence of substantial
expenditures, a position that prior cases have only intimated. Whether
the court must now determine the enforceability of contracts as part of
the test of substantial expenditures is unclear. Exactly how much of the
total cost of construction must be expended before the vested right
accrues is left to the jury's discretion and will probably change with each
set of facts. In any event, it is safe to predict that future permittees will
have an easier task in acquiring a vested right.
ELIZABETHa LYNNE Pou
Securities Regulation-Allowance of Attorneys' Fees
in 14(a) Derivative Suits
With the recognition of an implied private right of action under sec-
tion 14(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,1 individual shareholders
"276 N.C. 55, 170 S.E.2d at 909.
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964) [here-
inafter cited as 14(a)], provides:
(Vol. 49
